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SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
This Manned Space Flight Safety Program Directive establishes the system
safety requirements for Manned Space Flight Programs.
All Manned Space Flight Programs or activities initiated after the date of
this issuance shall select from these requirements applicable tasks and place
them in individual procurement contracts and statements of work.
This Directive has been prepared under the authority of NASA Management
Instruction 1138.12, Functions and Authority, Director, Manned Space
Flight Safety; NASA Management Instruction 1700.2, Manned Space Flight
Safety Program; and in accordance with NHB 1700.1, NASA Safety Manual.
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SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
SECTION I
SCOPE
I. I PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to establish system safety requirements for
Manned Space Flight Program Offices, Centers and installations participating
in NASA Manned Space Flight Programs.
1.2 APPLICATION
Center Program Safety Offices will select from this document the applicable
tasks and place them in individual procurement contracts and statements-of-
work. The Center Program Offices should compare the benefits to be derived
with the problems of implementation and coordinate any maior deviations with
the appropriate Safety Director, Headquarters Program Office.
In the application of these requirements, care shall be exercised to avoid
confllcts between technical disciplines, to establish an integrated effort and
to avoid duplication of effort by capitalizing on the use of existing data.
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SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
SECTION 2
DOCUMENTS
2.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following documents form a part of this issuance to the extent specified
herein.
NPD 1701. I
NMI 1138.12
NMI 1136.8A
NMI 1700.2
Basic Policy on Safety
Functions and Authorities--Director, Manned Space
Flight Safety Office
Functions and Authorities--NASA Safety Director
Manned Space Flight Safety Program
2.2 REFERENCES
NHB 1700.1
NHB 7121.1
AFSC DH 1-6
AFETRM 127-1
NASA Safety Manual
Phase Project Planning Guidelines
System Safety Design Handbook
Range Safety Manual
Accident/Incident/Mission Failure Reporting and
Investigating Handbook Interim Draft, 5 November 1968
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SECTION 3
DEFINITIONS
3. I SAFETY TERMS
The following terms used in this document are defined:
a. Safety--Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel,
equipment or property.
b. System Safety--The optimum degree of risk management within
the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost
attained through the application of management and engineering
principles throughout all phases of a program.
c. Accident Prevention--Methads and procedures used to eliminate
the causes which lead, or could lead, to an accident.
d. Hazard--The presence of a potential risk situation caused by an
unsafe act or condition.
e. Risk--The chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or
property.
f. Major Damage--Damage to equipment which results in major
system degradation or loss.
g. Major System Degradation--A condition which results in one or
more of the following:
(1) Jeopardized achievement of an operation or performance
of a mission; or delay beyond acceptable time limits.
(2) Inadvertent system activation.
3.2 HAZARD CATEGORIES
Identified
a.
b.
system hazardous conditions shall be categorized as follows:
Safety Catastrophic--Condition(s) such that environment,
personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies,
or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade
system performance, and cause subsequent system loss, death,
or multiple injuries to personnel.
Safety Critical--Condition(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
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subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage
or personnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate
corrective action for personnel or system survival.
Safety MarginaI--Conditlon(s) such that environment, personnel
error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or sub-
system failure or component malfunction will degrade system
performance but which can be counteracted or controlled without
major damage or any injury to personnel.
Safety Negligible--Conditlon(s) such that personnel error, design
characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or subsystem failure or
component malfunction will not result in major system degradation,
and will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury.
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SECTION 4
REQUIREMENTS
4.1 SYSTEM SAFETY PLAN (SSP)
An SSP prepared in accordance with the requirements of this document shall
be prepared by the Contractor or by NASA for in-house work. The SSP, as
approved by the procuring activity and incorporated into the contract, be-
comes the basis for contractual compliance. The plan must describe an inte-
grated effort within the total project; it shall indicate how other systems
analyses (i.e., failure modes and effects analyses) will be used to preclude
duplication of analytical work. Existing documents may be referenced and
submitted as part of the System Safety Plan.
The System Safety Plan shall contain a description of the system safety ele-
ments, as described below, which are considered necessary to insure effective
management of a system safety program compatible with the NASA Safety
Manual, NHB 1700.1.
4.1.1 Organization
The plan shall: (1) identify the organization and key personnel responsible
for managing the overall system safety program, and (2) clearly define the
responsibilities and functions of those directly associated with system safety
policies and implementation. It shall stipulate the authority delegated to
this organization to implement its policies. The relationship between llne,
staff, and interdepartmental, project functional, and general management
organizations shall be identified.
4.1.2 Management and Control
The plan shall include these elements, as appropriate: (1) a detailed listing
of specific tasks and procedures to implement and control these tasks; (2) a
current description of each task to be performed whether or not it is already
documented in existing directives; (3) identification of the organizational
4-1
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unit with the authority and responsibility for executing each task; (4) the
method of control to insure execution of each task as planned; (5) the schedule
start and completion dates of each task; (6) identification of known technical
problems to be solved; (7) an assessment of impact of these problems on speci-
fied program requirements; (8) detailed proposed solutions to the problems and
a program to solve the problem; (9) procedures for recording status of actions
to resolve problems; (10)method of dissemination of the system safety require-
ments to designers and associated personnel to expedite correction of known
deficiencies; (11) designation of milestones, definition of interrelationships,
and estimation of times required for system safety program activities and tasks;
(12) periodic status recording of progress achieved in reducing or ellminating
identified hazards and (13)delineation of the data and analyses required of and
to the participating organizations.
4.1.3 Program Review
The plan shall schedule reviews to assess the safety status as part of each key
program milestone° As the project develops, system safety progress shall be
assessed by results of succeeding design reviews and tests, including effects
of human performance.
4.2 HAZARD ANALYSES
The safety plan shall provide for the periodic performance and refinement of
hazard analyses; and periodic assessment of achieved versus specified require-
ments for all specified missions or operational modes of the system. These
studies shall include the environmental conditions of operational use, and
the effect of human and equipment failure on the safety of the system. The
results of hazard analyses will be employed in el iminating and controlling
critical hazards and, as necessary, in the preparation of specifications, pro-
cedures, and program milestone reviews.
4.2.1 Prel iminary Anal yses
Prellmlnary analyses shall be conducted early in the Preliminary Analyses
and Definition phases to provide a comprehensive, qualitative analysis of
the system/subsystem/equlpment in its intended operating environment for
detecting and defining its potential hazards. Such information shall be used
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in the developmentof safety criteria to be included in the performance/
design specifications. Consideration should be given to at least the
following areas:
a. Isolation of energy sources.
b. Fuels and propellants: their characteristics, hazard levels
and quantity/distance constraints; handling, storage, and
transportation safety features; compatibility factors, etc.
c. Proposed system environmental constraints.
d. Use of explosive devices and their hazard constraints.
e. Compatibility of materials.
f. Effect of transient current, electromagnetic radiation, and
ionizing radiation. Design of controls to prevent inadvertent
activation of initiation circuits.
g. Use of pressure vessels and associated piping.
h. Crashworthiness for manned systems.
i. Documentation for safe operation and maintenance of the
system.
j. Training and certification pertaining to safe operation and
maintenance of the system.
k. Egress, rescue, survival, and salvage.
I. Life support requirements and its safety implications in manned
systems.
m. Fire sources and protection.
n. Resistance to shock damage.
o. Equipment layout and lighting requirements and their safety
implications in manual system.
p. Nuclear and isotope power sources or experiments.
q. System interactions.
r. Meteoroid penetration.
s. Docking consideration.
t. Long term storage.
4.2.2 Detailed Hazard Analyses
The preliminary analyses for hazard identification initiated in the Preliminary
Analysis Phase shall be expanded in depth in the Definition and Design Phases.
These analyses are to include the systems and subsystems equipment and their
interfaces. Catastrophic hazards shall be eliminated or controlled. Results
of analyses which indicate unresolved catastrophic and critical hazard cate-
gories shall be immediately reported to the procuring activity by Safety Analysis
Reports (SAR). Nuclear systems will meet a negligible hazard category unless
a waiver is granted.
4-3
li 11 tl 11 1t li U il 11 It li ti li li li 11 11 g I_ Ii
4.2.3 Operating Hazard Analyses
Analyses shall be conducted to determine safety requirements for personnel,
procedures, and equipment used in installation, maintenance, support, testing,
operations, emergency escape, egress, rescue, and training. Results of
these analyses shall provlde the basis for: (1)deslgn changes, where feasible,
to eliminate hazards or provide safety devices, safeguards, etc; (2) inputs to
the warning, caution, and emergency procedures section of test operating
and maintenance procedures and instructions; (3) identification of a hazardous
period time span and actions required if such hazards occur; and (4) special
procedures for servicing, hanclllng, storage and transportation.
4.3 HAZARD REDUCTION PRECEDENCE SEQUENCE
Actions for reducing hazards identified in above analyses shall be, in order
of precedence, as specified in paragraphs 4.3.1 through 4.3.5 of these
requ irements.
4.3.1 Design for Minimum Hazard
The major effort throughout the design phases shall be to insure inherent
safety through the selection of appropriate design features as fall safe,
redundancy, and increased ultimate safety factor.
4.3.2 Safety Devices
Known hazards which cannot be eliminated through design selection shall be
reduced to the acceptable level through the use of appropriate safety devices
as part of the system, subsystem, or equipment.
4.3.3 Warning Devices
Where it is not possible to preclude the existence or occurrence of a known
hazard, devices shall be employed for the timely detection of the condition
and the generation of an adequate warning signal. Warning signals and their
appllcation shall be designed to minimize the probability of wrong signals or
of improper personnel reaction to the signals.
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4.3.4 Special Procedures
Where it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of an existing or potential
hazard through design, or the use of safety and warning devices, special
procedures shall be developed to counter hazardous conditions for enhance-
ment of ground and flight crew safety. Precautionary notations shall be
standardized in accordance with the direction of the procuring activity.
4.3.5 Residual Hazards
Residual hazards for which safety or warning devices and special procedures
cannot be developed or provided for counteracting the hazard shall be spe-
cifically identified to safety and program management. Continuation of
effort to ellmlnate or reduce such hazards shall be accompllshed throughout
the program by maintaining awareness of new safety technology or devices
being developed and their application to the residual hazards. Justification
for the retention of residual hazards shall be documented.
4.4 SAFETY TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
Safety information on approved methods and procedures will be included in
the proficiency certification training of operational personnel in hazardous
operations. A current status of certification will be maintained and oriented
to missions, configurations and locations. Protective devices and emergency
equipment will be identified and included. Hazards will be brought to the
attention of trainees. Proficiency demonstrations of training are required for
hazardous operations.
4.5 HUMAN ENGINEERING
Procedures shall be developed to assure the application of safety related
human engineering principles during design, development, manufacture,
test, maintenance, and operation of the system or subsystem to minimize
human error.
4.6 INTERFACE WITH OTHER PROGRAM FUNCTIONS
The safety program shall be coordinated with the other program functions to
avoid overlaps and conflicts between the technical disciplines, and to
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establishan integratedeffort. Thiscoordination shall include: the delineation
of responsibilitles, managementstructure, joint analyses, reportingprocedures,
feedbackof testing data and corrective actions, useof failure modeand effects
analysisor other analytical techniquesto identify hazards.
4.7 INDUSTRIALSAFETYAND PUBLICSAFETY
Thesystem safety program will include coordination with the industrial and
publlc safety efforts to ensure an effective and integrated total safety effort.
4.8 HAZARD DATA COLLECTIONI ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
Using existing data systems wherever practical, a system for hazard reporting,
data storager and feedback of corrective action shall be formulated. This
will involve a closed-loop system for collecting, analyzing, and recording
all reported hazards that occur in-plant or at installation sites.
4.9 SAFETY DATA
Safety data provided by the procuring activity shall be used as a design aid
to prevent repetitive design deficiencies.
Data prepared in connection with analyses and studies conducted in compli-
ance with this document shall be delivered in accordance with paragraph 6.2.
4.10 MISHAP INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING
All mishaps (including accldents/incldents) will be investigated, utilizlng
applicable techniques as contained in the Accident/Incident/Mission Failure
Reporting and Investigation Handbook for cause(s) and system safety implica-
tions. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations will be documented
and provided to the appropriate action agencies for disposition. The contractor
shall be prepared to provide technical assistance to boards investigating mishaps
which occur within his jurisdiction.
4-6
11 11 I1 1i 11 It 11 il II II li Ii li ii li 11 tl g 1_ g
SYSTEM SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR
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SECTION 5
SYSTEM SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION ASSURANCE
5.1 MARGIN OF SAFETY TESTING
Provisions shall be made to assure that adequate validation tests are performed
on critical devices or components to determine the degree of hazard or margin
of safety of design. Induced failure tests should also be considered for dem-
onstrating the failure mode of critical components.
5.2 SAFETY MONITORING
Observation of designated hazardous/dangerous operations will be accom-
plished as necessary to insure adherence to safety principles and compliance
with safety requirements and checklists. Normally, the degree of monitoring
necessary (spot-check, full time monitoring, etc.) will vary depending upon
such factors as: the nature of the operation; the history/experience; the
quality of technical data available; the personnel involved and the type of
facilities available. Other factors may also be decisive and the degree of
monitoring required should be periodically evaluated as the state-of-the-
art progresses.
5.3 SAFETY AUDITS
The Program Safety Function will audit the Centers' compliance with estab-
lished safety requirements, assuring that adequate requirements have been
placed on their contractors and that each contractor has developed and is
implementing a System Safety Plan applicable to his contract end items.
Center Safety Functions will audit the Centers' implementation of established
safety requirements and their contractors' safety program performance. The
contractors will audit their own conformance to safety requirements and the
performance of their subcontractors and suppliers, as appropriate.
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These audits will evaluate the degree of conformance to the established
safety requirements. Requlrements audited will also include safety require-
ments specified in design, manufacturing, test and operational specifications.
5.4 REVIEW OF CHANGES
When changes are proposed for equipment design or procedures, analyses
will be performed for the proposed configuration to identify and resolve
possible hazards that may be introduced into the system. The results of these
analyses shall be provided to the Configuration Control Board (CCB) for
consideration.
5.5 POSTFLIGHT EVALUATION
Safety personnel shall participate in postfllght reviews and obtain a safety
evaluation of areas in which anomalous conditions were revealed. This
safety evaluation will provide guidance in planning future missions and
establishing necessary corrective action to reduce hazards. Areas for con-
sideration include:
a. Safety adequacy of procedures and protective equipment.
b. Response of warning devices and effectiveness of emergency
procedures and equipment.
c. Effects of unforecast and unpredlcted events.
d. Effects of human capabilities and constraints on Crew Safety.
e. Provision for pertinent inputs to data file.
f. Assuring that applicable activities receive pertinent information
for appropriate corrective actions.
5.6 DATA REQUIREMENTS
The selected data requirements in support of this document will be reflected
in the Contractor Data Requirements List (NASA Form 1106), attached to the
request for proposal, invitation for bid, or the contract, as appropriate. All
safety data developed on a program shall be filed, maintained and made
available for review and use by authorized representatives of the procuring
activity upon request.
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